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Abstract
The aviation work environment has one of the highest accident rates of any industry sector in the United States, resulting in significant costs
for both employee injuries and equipment damage. In fact, injury rates exceed rates found in areas that are widely recognized as hazardous, such
as construction and mining, and it is estimated that aircraft ground damage costs are as high as 5 billion to 10 billion dollars per year. Purdue
University’s Aviation Technology Department has conducted numerous safety and human factors studies in the past decade encompassing
maintenance and repair operations, corporate flight departments, and over ten major airlines. Based on the accumulated knowledge gained from
these studies, a systematic method to reduce workplace costs associated with aircraft damage and worker injuries has been developed. This
concept paper summarizes the resulting best practices and methods, which are centered on four main themes: (1) organizational infrastructure,
(2) systematic process, (3) measurement, and (4) education. Successfully addressing components related to these four areas has been a major
driver and the key to successful ramp operations in the commercial passenger aviation sector. This framework has been used to successfully
develop, implement, and maintain and manage human factors sustainability, which refers to creating and maintaining a sustainable environment
in terms of the human factors needed to safely and efficiently conduct operations in the aviation environment.
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Introduction
Aviation is the safest mode for passenger travel in the
United States, as evidenced by the death rates illustrated in
Figure 1. Although many people are apprehensive about air
travel, in fact, air travel is more than 200 times safer than
travel in a motor vehicle (National Safety Council, 2011).
The safety of the aviation system is ensured through tight
regulation of aircraft and pilots and well developed
protocol for procedures at every stage: in the cockpit, in
the cabin, and through the services provided by air traffic
control, maintenance, and dispatch.
Unfortunately, outside the aircraft, when the aircraft
lands on the ground and transitions out of the area
controlled by air traffic control or ground control, safety
diminishes considerably, as shown in Figure 2. In fact,
workers in the scheduled air transportation sector have a
nonfatal injury rate more than twice the national average,
exceeding not only the US average, but also traditionally
high risk sectors such as coal mining, forestry and logging,
and construction (Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 2012).
Not surprisingly, the high injury rate in the airline sector
translates into higher than average lost work days, as shown
in Figure 3 (BLS, 2010). The injury rate in the airline
industry is more than twice the national average, and the
number of injuries that result in days missed from work is
more than three times the national average; furthermore, the
incidence in the airline industry is higher than sectors that
are traditionally considered high risk, specifically mining
and construction (cases are per year per 100 employees).
The impact of injuries and lost work in the United States is
substantial. In fact, for all industries in the United States,
the total cost for nonfatal injuries has been estimated
at $186 billion, which is based on an average cost of
$21,700 for each of the 8.559 million injuries annually
(Leigh, 2011). While medical costs are a significant
consideration, they comprise only 27% of the total cost
of workplace injuries, while the remaining 73% of the total
cost of workplace injuries is attributable to indirect costs

Figure 1. Passenger safety by mode in US, fatality rate per 1 million
passenger miles (National Safety Council, 2011).

Figure 2. Worker safety by industry sector (injury rate per 100 workers per
year) (Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 2013).

associated with lost wages and worker replacement costs
(Leigh, 2011).
The incidence and cost of ramp injuries is significant,
and the cost of ramp incidents extends beyond injuries.
Many incidents also result in aircraft damage, with an
average cost of $250,000 per event (Vandel, 2004). Overall
estimates for ramp damage were estimated at $5 billion in
2004 (Vandel, 2004); adjusting for inflation, this is
equivalent to $6.3 billion in 2014 (CPI Inflation
Calculator, n.d.), which would be equivalent to purchasing
67 Boeing 737-800 aircraft every year, based on an average
purchase price of $93.3 million in 2014 (Boeing, 2014).
Safety Management Systems (SMS) have been initiated
in aviation to provide a comprehensive, process-oriented
approach to managing safety. SMS include safety promotion,
which encompasses communication and training, as well as
safety policy, safety assurance, and safety risk management
(FAA, 2014). SMS has been adopted by most airlines (e.g.,
Liou, Yen, & Tzeng, 2007; Chen & Chen, 2012) and is
becoming standard in all facets of aviation. While airports
may also implement SMS (FAA, 2007), the lack of regulatory
requirement has reduced the incentive to do so. In any case,
the formal implementation of SMS into the aviation ramp
environment has been very limited, and it’s not clear that

Figure 3. Injuries by industry, total and cases resulting in days missed from
work (BLS, 2010).
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traditional SMS alone will assure an adequate level of safety
on the ramp. While SMS acknowledges safety culture, it does
not outline a comprehensive system for assuring that safety
culture is addressed through a sustainable human factors
framework.
Ninety-two percent of ramp damage is due to human
error and may be attributable to inadequate training,
inadequate supervision, failure to follow procedures, work
pressures, and inappropriate equipment (Giovanni, 2011).
To address and mitigate this high error rate, human error
needs to be addressed in the context of not only error
attributable to a single person, but also error attributed to
the system, which includes culture, system design, and
organizational elements (Reason, 2000). The proposed
framework for human factors sustainability is a system
design that will enable a safe and efficient operation in the
aviation environment.
This paper proposes an integrated framework to increase
safety and foster human factors sustainability in the
aviation ramp environment. Implementation of the framework presented in this document results in improved
communication and coordination among team members on
the ramp, improved communication and coordination
between ramp workers and their supervisors, and improved
communication and coordination between ramp supervisors
and the managers and executives to whom they report. The
increased communication and coordination that results
from the proposed framework fosters a safer ramp
environment, including a reduced likelihood of damage to
aircraft and equipment, as well as reduced likelihood of
personnel injury. The purpose of this paper is to describe
the theoretical framework for fostering human factors
sustainability and increased safety in ramp operations.
A Proposed Framework for Human Factors Sustainability
Human factors encompasses the development and design
of a system to accommodate the interaction of both people
and equipment within the environment. Human factors incorporates both the physical and the cultural and psychological

factors that affect safe and productive work. Human
factors sustainability refers to the development of a
working environment, process, and infrastructure that
enables the human factors considerations to support the
success of operations in the long-term.
The proposed framework for fostering human factors
sustainability and increased safety has been developed
based on a number of activities including researcher
participation in standard airline training programs;
observation of actual ramp operations at mainline airport
hubs; discussion with airline representatives who oversee
ramp operations, ramp training activities, and ramp
quality control audits; and follow up with industry
representatives during safety workshops. The aforementioned activities led to the identification of four key
components to reduce ramp incidents that result in injury
and aircraft damage and foster a positive environment for
human factors sustainability.
1.
2.
3.
4.

Organizational Infrastructure
Systematic Process
Measurements
Education

Organizational Infrastructure. In order for optimal
safety to be realized, it must be supported at all levels of the
organization. Key players and their roles are shown in
Figure 4, which is a variation of a concept originally put
forth by Lopp & Brazee (2005). While some organizational
theories suggest a ‘‘top down’’ or a ‘‘bottom up’’ approach,
the human factors sustainability model requires ongoing
and synergistic activities at all levels of the organization.
Employees at all levels have important roles that must be
undertaken to achieve sustainability.
Front line employees and supervisors are the primary
focus, since they are responsible for day-to-day activities.
These employees must be trained, educated and provided
with the tools to do their job. These ‘‘tools’’ include not
only physical resources, but also ongoing education and
cultural support to do their job safely. Brief daily meetings
regarding safety and longer weekly meetings with increased

Key Players
Strategic Team

Executive
Management

Vice Presidents

Tactical Team
Selective Champions
Development and
Implementation
Middle Management
Supervisor
Front Line Employees

CEO and COO

Directors
Managers

Buy-in and
interaction
Education and Daily
Application

Supervisors and
Leads
Front Line
Employees

Figure 4. Safety must be supported at all levels of the organization for success.
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content can play an important role in communicating and
reinforcing safe operations. Middle management must support
supervisors and employees and play a critical role through
their ‘‘buy-in’’ by providing a communications link up
to the tactical team. The tactical team provides support
through the development of appropriate training programs
and resources by monitoring measurements related to
human factors sustainability and safety. Support of the
executive team is imperative, and it must include time and
financial resources at all levels to track progress and
support ongoing improvement. While the safety team is a
critical component, it is important to realize that successful implementation of safety can only occur if safety is a
priority for everyone in the organization, and not limited
to the jurisdiction of the safety team.
It is valuable to utilize tools such as the Cultural Index
Guide (Reason, 1997) to assess the status of the organization.
The rating scale shown in Figure 5 is an extension of the
framework put forth by Reason (1997) and also attributed to

Category
Response to
Safety
Violations
Philosophy
Safety
Messengers

Bureaucratic
(rating =3)
Reactive

Generative
(rating = 5)
Proactive

Don’t want to know
about safety problems
Whistle blowers are
“shot”

May not find out about
safety problems
Safety messengers
may be listened to if
they can get through
the bureaucracy
Policy may exist but is
not translated into
practice; policy may
be extensively
documented but not in
a useful format due to
language and/or length

Actively seek out
safety problems
Safety messengers are
trained and rewarded

Policy is minimal and
communication is
negative or absent

Responsibility

Shared responsibility
with no clear chain of
command; if
everyone is
responsible, no one is
responsible and
accountable
Punished or
concealed
Actively discouraged

Response to
Failure
Innovation and
New Ideas

Westrum (1991; 1999). The rating scale was subsequently
revised to include additional interim categories for a
safety ladder that includes pathological, reactive, calculative, proactive, and generative, and has been attributed
to Hudson (1998; 2003). Figure 5 can be used to assess
the organizational culture, with ratings in each category
provided by employees at all levels. This can also be
used as a tool to track changes in organizational culture
over time. Organizations with positive or generative
cultures are the goal, and produce the optimal outcomes.
Organizations with negative or pathological cultures can
realize dramatic gains by making organizational changes to
improve human factors sustainability. Purdue human factors
research has found, very often, that executives will rate an
organization as being more generative, whereas employees
will rate the organization as being more pathological.
Regardless of the corporate policy, it is the local workplace
culture and environment that ultimately impact the activities
and results in the operational work envelope of the ramp.

Pathological
(rating =1)
No action or
inappropriate action

Policy and
Communication
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Compartmentalized
responsibility

Lead to local repairs
Often present
problems

Proactive
communication
addresses safety issues
in a useful way;
communication is up
and down the chain of
command in response
to challenges and
opportunities
Responsibility is
shared at all levels but
specific responsibilities
are clearly defined for
each employee

Lead to far-reaching
reforms
Welcomed at all levels

Figure 5. Types of organizational culture (modified version of table developed by Reason,1997).
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The local work environment may vary from location to
location, and even from shift to shift. Influencers of the local
work environment are shown in Figure 6, based on the results
of a survey conducted by Purdue University (Lopp & Brazee,
2005). The team leader and most experienced peer are
responsible for approximately 75% of the local culture,
whereas the impact of the middle manager is negligible.
Developing an effective team culture at the local level requires
peer-to-peer communication that reinforces appropriate
actions, must be facilitated by a positive workplace behavior,
and is created by direct interaction and the influence of front
line team leaders.
The importance of peers cannot be overstated, and due to
this impact, it is important to identify ‘‘champions’’ who
will reinforce appropriate attitudes and actions on the ramp,
even when the supervisor is not present.

accountable for ensuring that appropriate training resources
are provided for both supervisors and front line employees,
and for ensuring that policies that have been developed are
being followed consistently. The systematic process must
also build in communication channels and metrics so the
effectiveness of safety policies and practices can be
assessed and modified, as necessary, on a continuing basis.
Processes must include both formal policy and procedure,
and also build in time for regular interaction to support a
generative safety culture. Regular, scheduled interaction
should include time for employees to provide feedback to
supervisors regarding current practices, for supervisors to
provide oversight of front line employees, for managers
to meet with supervisors to review safety metrics and get
feedback regarding ramp activities, and for managers to
brief the executive team on safety performance and
concerns.

Systematic Process
Measurements
Systematic process refers to the development of a system to
support human factors sustainability. This can be accomplished by identifying accountability at each level in the
organization. Accountability must address not only who is
responsible, but also the span of control, expectations for
performance, and associated measurements. A well-defined
systematic process identifies appropriate measurements to
ensure accountability and identifies an appropriate process for
measuring and reporting measurements.
The systematic process must address accountability at
every level in the organization, mapping back to specific
roles and accountabilities for each position shown in
Figure 4. For example, an executive management team
must ensure corporate resources accommodate safety
activities, and must hold directors and managers accountable for the development and implementation of safety
policies and metrics that can be communicated up and
down the chain of command. Managers are also typically

Figure 6. Factors that influence local culture (Lopp & Brazee, 2005).

Measurements are critical to assuring progress is made
and maintained with respect to human factors sustainability
and other organizational goals. Measurements provide an
objective and proactive means of assessing the systematic
processes that have been developed. Measurements facilitate compliance and reduce errors and incidents at all
organizational levels. Measurements will also provide a
tool beyond injuries and property damage, which are
‘‘worst case’’ measurements that ideally will be avoided
altogether. Measurements, while important, are not a
substitute for incident investigation or reporting.
Measurements should be maintained in a database to
support trend analysis and decision making and provide
feedback on operational changes. Measurements should be
developed in many areas—to assess resource allocation,
policy implementation, and daily culture. Measurements
may include employee ratings of organizational culture (per
Figure 4), time and resources devoted to training, employee
turnover, engagement in continuous improvement processes, 360 degree employee evaluations, and direct
observation of compliance. It is importance to recognize
the influence of the observation period and the random
distribution of incidents. If one period has an unusually
high rate of incidents, the following period is likely to have
a reduced rate of incidents even if no countermeasures are
implemented, due to the ‘‘regression-to-mean’’ effect.
Metrics to assess contributions to human factors
sustainability should be incorporated into accountability
dashboards not only for organizational units but also for
individual employees. Each employee in an organization
should be evaluated for their role in the human factor
sustainability process. A quantitative and qualitative
assessment component for human factors sustainability
should be included in regular employee evaluations; just as
employees are rated in terms of their productivity,
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communication skills, and other performance metrics, they
should be rated in terms of their adherence to safety policy,
participation in proactive human factors sustainability
practices, and communication and support of other employees
and peers (above and below them in the organizational chart).
Relevant elements of Figure 5 can be incorporated into
performance assessment documents for both individual
employees and organizational units, as illustrated by the
metrics shown in Figure 7.
In many cases, current measurements, if they exist at all,
are focused on high stakes outcomes such as injuries and
aircraft damage. This practice does not capture the many
components that contribute to positive human factors
sustainability and does not provide a way to measure the
risk associated with current practices. Current measurements at a more detailed level, such as ramp audits,
typically focus on completion of the task for the team,
without documenting individual performance or capturing
the order of activities. Metrics such as documentation of
daily safety briefs and the appropriateness of their content
(e.g., tailoring content to the specific team, activities, and
weather conditions) were typically not used prior to
implementation of the proposed framework.
Education
It is important that education be ongoing and match
the daily needs of the employee at each level in the
organization. Measurements through assessments can

identify areas where additional education is needed, as
well as document the effectiveness of training programs.
Assessments can be made in all facets, from technical
components of operation, to behavioral science and
production management skills. Assessment may include
written assessments as well as observations. Behavioral
science research indicates that behavior is shaped primarily
by two factors: antecedents and consequences (University
of Kansas, n.d.). Antecedents occur before the behavior,
and include training, policy, and promised incentives or
disincentives. Consequences occur after the behavior and
include feedback (positive or negative), bonuses, reprimands or disciplinary action. As shown in Figure 8,
antecedents have only a 20% influence on behavior,
whereas consequences have an 80% influence on behavior.
To be most effective, consequences should be positive (vs.
negative), immediate (vs. future) and certain (vs. uncertain). Reinforcement of behavior through appropriate
consequences is an important concept in human factors
sustainability. Building in positive, immediate, and certain
impact into the culture requires a system that accommodates first level recognition, reporting, and reaction. This
can only be accomplished if the supervisor is directly
supervising the line or ramp operations, rather than
engaged with administrative tasks such as email or
paperwork in an office, which makes him or her
unavailable to the front line employees. Middle management can support all employees by assuring that adequate
supervision and training is provided.

Leadership Measurement Human Factors Sustainability
Do They:

low
high
1 ……………..5

GM/Directors
Participate in announcing and supporting HF program
Provide financial resource and management time for HF program
Follow-up on HF measurement program and provide input for improvement
Work with Mangers in providing guidance in HF culture influence

Total

_________

Total

_________

Managers
Support HF program briefings and participate in shift briefings
Monitor the HF implementation process
Measure shifting briefings structure and activity
Measure safety culture and provide input to supervisors
Develop, record, and report HF performance results
Walk the floor and provide a positive HF influence
Work with supervisors in providing HF guidance

1st Line
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Supervisors

Conduct HF performance reports
Integrate HF as equal importance in shift briefings
Provide daily positive HF influence in employee work environment
Monitor HF behaviors and provide immediate feedback

Total

_________

Figure 7. Human factors (HF) sustainability metrics must be identified and assessed at every organizational level.
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Figure 8. Consequences have a greater influence on behavior
than antecedents.

Feedback also occurs at other levels in the organization.
Management communicates organizational priorities not only
through mission statements and policies, but also through their
own behaviors in the work environment. Corrective and
reinforcing feedback are key at all organizational levels.
Letting inappropriate behaviors ‘‘slide’’ just once, which may
be direct or indirect through a lack of feedback, results in a
culture that accepts the inappropriate behavior. When a
supervisor or management reinforces productivity over a
possible human factors infraction event, there is a large
negative impact developing in a positive safety culture.
Training and education must be ongoing, not only
through periodic, scheduled, and formal training, but also
through less formal daily feedback at all organizational
levels. Safety training and, equally important, reinforcement of a culture consistent with human factors sustainability must permeate every level of the organization.
Safety learning must be conducted as part of the work
experience through a variety of activities, including:

N Mentoring: includes both formal and informal programs.
N Briefings: includes reporting of measurements as well
as ongoing training briefings.

N Feedback: includes both positive and corrective
feedback, which is most effective when issued
immediately and constructively.
N Peer coaching: includes feedback on all activities to
anticipate, celebrate, and remediate actions that have
occurred.
Values and beliefs must be demonstrated not only through
policy statements, but also through employee behaviors in
‘‘real-time,’’ which means immediate and appropriate feedback, both positive and corrective. This can only be achieved
if all employees understand appropriate actions and are trained
in the provision of appropriate feedback in terms of
timeliness, positive feedback, and respectful communication
when corrective action is required for peers, subordinates, and
superiors. This often requires additional training and attention
to ‘‘soft’’ or ‘‘people’’ skills, in addition to training that
focuses on technical, operational, or managerial skills.

A front line employee is observed standing on the baggage
loader when a ladder should be used for safety.
Pathological response 1. The incident is witnessed with
no response. It is the responsibility of the front line
employees and supervisors to manage themselves.
Impact: The lack of corrective feedback provides a clear
message that safety is not a priority for the safety team,
directors, or managers.
Pathological response 2. The safety team member
directly approaches the employee and explains why it is
important to use a ladder for safety, and waits until the
employee corrects his behavior.
Impact: This usurps the supervisor and implicitly
transfers responsibility for safety from the supervisor
to the safety team.
Bureaucratic response 1. The safety team member sends
an email to the supervisor, documenting the occurrence,
including date, time, and location.
Impact: The event is documented, but the lack of
immediate corrective feedback communicates that safety
is a policy rather than practice-oriented activity.
Generative response 1. The safety team member directly
approaches the supervisor so the supervisor can immediately address the occurrence with corrective feedback.
Impact: The immediate corrective feedback while the
director and manager delay their activities communicates the importance of safety implementation;
utilization of the supervisor for corrective feedback
maintains the authority of the supervisor for ramp
safety.
Example Application 2. Briefings conducted by supervisors occur daily and weekly to address ongoing activities
and emphasize priorities.
Pathologic activity 1. The supervisor discusses productivity and on-time goals at daily and weekly meetings,
reflecting the metrics he must provide to his manager and
director.
Impact: Safety is neglected as productivity and on-time
goals are prioritized throughout the organization.

Example Applications
Below are example applications that illustrate the
pathological, bureaucratic and generative environment for
human factor sustainability.
Example Application 1. A representative of the safety
team is on the ramp with an airline director and a manager.

Bureaucratic activity 2. The supervisor discusses
productivity and on-time goals at daily and weekly
meetings. Safety is mentioned in a perfunctory way and
may be minimally addressed with reference to company
policy, especially after an injury or an incident resulting in
damage.
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Impact: Safety may be nominally acknowledged, but
without a structure or human factors sustainability to
support it, other more immediate concerns take precedence.
Generative activity 1. The supervisor incorporates safety
in a meaningful way in all briefings. Safety policy is
discussed not only in the context of policy, but also in the
context of actual practices as they relate to daily activities.
Front line employees are expected to participate in hazard
evaluations associated with tasks, such as the hazard matrix
shown in Figure 9, as well as support development of
safety policy that reflects actual practice. Front line
employee input is provided to management through the
supervisor, addressing ‘‘near misses’’ and other safety
information that may not be captured by traditional injury
reports. Management and directors provide information
regarding incidence and costs associated with injury
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regularly to supervisors and front line employees.
Executive and director-level employees assure that
resources allow management and supervisors to devote
needed time and resources to safety. Training programs
address risks and best safety practices for daily tasks and
special tasks. Risk matrices and safety best practices are
integrated into job assignments to keep safety on the
forefront of employee consciousness. Special topics in
daily and weekly briefings are supported by safety data
from the organization, as well as training modules that
highlight risks and best safety practices.
Impact: Safety practices are ‘‘owned’’ at all levels and
reflect data-driven decisions. Employees at all levels
participate and are held accountable. Safety practices
and policies reflect actual best practices. Safety culture is
promoted and reinforced by daily activities.

Figure 9. Hazard risk assessment matrix and safety activities to develop matrix for specific tasks in generative environment.
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Conclusions
The effectiveness of any organization is limited by its
ability to conduct its mission safely and efficiently. This
paper identifies four key components that are necessary to
successfully implement human factors sustainability into
aviation ramp operations based on the experience of Purdue
researchers, their observations of ramp activities, and their
consultations with airline industry representatives. Human
factors sustainability not only increases safety and performance, but also results in an organization with a generative or
progressive culture that will facilitate continuous improvement
and employee satisfaction.
1.
2.
3.
4.

Organizational Infrastructure
Systematic Process
Measurements
Education

Evaluation of an organization and its policies and
practices relative to these four key components provides a
structure to outline the roles and responsibility of each
person in the organization from the CEO to front line
worker. The proposed framework provides a structure to
support human factors sustainability and a positive safety
culture.
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